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Some Implications of the Constitutional
Privilege To Defame-
Robert E. Keeton*
In this issue of the Vanderbilt Law Review we honor an extraordi-
nary scholar, teacher, and Dean. It is a happy circumstance that the
editors have offered us this opportunity at a time when we can confi-
dently predict that Dean Wade will continue to serve us with great
distinction in years ahead. The present article concerns some pending
problems in the law of defamation that have already attracted Dean
Wade's active interest. This seems a particularly fitting subject for
inclusion in a symposium celebrating not only his distinguished past
service but also a commencement incident to his release from decanal
responsibility.
I. THE ALl CONTROVERSY OVER LIBEL PER SE
When the controversy over libel per se and libel per quod1 was
before the American Law Institute (ALI) for the second successive year
in 1966, Laurence Eldredge of Pennsylvania moved 2 that the black letter
of section 569 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts be identical with
that of the original Restatement, which provides: "One who falsely, and
without a privilege to do so, publishes matter defamatory to another in
such a manner as to make the publication a libel is liable to the other
although no special harm or loss of reputation results therefrom." 3
In the Tentative Draft prepared for the annual meeting of 1966,
* Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School; On leave, 1971-72, Alumni Professor,
University of Minnesota; Member, American Law Institute. B.B.A. 1940, LL.B. 1941, University
of Texas; S.J.D. 1956, Harvard.
I. See Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REv. 733 (1966);
Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REV. 839 (1960); Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1629 (1966).
2. 1966 ALI PROCEEDINGS 434.
3. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 569 (1938).
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Dean Prosser, then Reporter for the Restatement (Second), recom-
mended that section 569 be revised to read as follows:
(1) One who publishes defamatory matter is subject to liability without proof of
special harm or loss of reputation if the defamation is
(a) libel whose defamatory innuendo is apparent from the publication itself
without reference to extrinsic facts by way of inducement, or
(b) libel or slander which imputes to another.
(i) a criminal offense, as stated in § 571,
(ii) a loathsome disease, as stated in § 572,
(iii) matter incompatible with his business, trade, profession or office,
as stated in § 573, or
(iv) unchastity on the part of a woman plaintiff, as stated in § 574.
(2) One who publishes any other defamation is subject to liability only upon proof
of special harm, as stated in § 575.1
During the deliberations of the Institute, Dean Wade moved an
amendment under which section 569 might read in substance: "One who
falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes matter defamatory
to another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel is not
liable to the other in the absence of proof of special harm or loss of
reputation unless he knew or should have known of the extrinsic facts
which were necessary to make the statement defamatory in its innu-
endo." 5 Although subjected to the charge that amongst all the conflict-
ing, ambiguous, and suggestive precedents none could be found to sup-
port this proposed amendment, Dean Wade's position prevailed.,
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
5. 1966 ALl PROCEEDINGS 448. Dean Wade moved "an amendment to Mr. Eldredge's
.motion to the effect that the old Section 569 be retained with the addition at the end [of a phrase
such as] 'unless he knew or should have known of the extrinsic facts which were necessary to make
the statement defamatory in its innuendo.'" Id. If the suggested phrase were appended without
any other modification of old § 569, it would make the defamed person's rights less secure and
give the defendant more protection when he knew or should have known of the extrinsic facts. As
those present during the proceedings surely understood, however, the purpose was to make the
defamed person's rights more secure and to give the defendant less protection. Although Dean
Prosser, Dean Wade, Mr. Eldredge, and others were aware of the drafting problem during the
Institute meeting, the Institute left it to future resolution with the understanding that the Reporter
would, at a subsequent annual meeting, present a revised draft reflecting the sense of the Institute's
action. Among the drafting options would be the following: (I) If the new phrase is introduced by
"unless," change "is liable to the other although" in the original text to "is not liable to the other
when"; (2) introduce the new phrase with "only if" rather than "unless"; (3) introduce the new
phrase with "if, but only if" rather than "unless." In the accompanying text I have followed the
first option, with an editorial variation. As thus drafted, the section might be interpreted as stating
only a rule of nonliability. On the other hand, it may also be interpreted as at least implying a rule
of liability-that is, liability without proof of special harm-when the terms of the "unless" clause
are fulfilled. A similar ambiguity would exist if the second option were followed. The third option
avoids the ambiguity and expressly states both a rule of liability and a rule of nonliability. Was
this a prophetic ambiguity? See text accompanying note 48 infra.
6. 1966 ALl PROCEEDINGS 460-65.
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Even as the vote was taken, a sense of uneasiness existed, among
the principals in this controversy and Institute members generally, about
potential incompatibility of the Restatement's rules on defama-
tion -particularly those classified under the rubric of privilege-and the
Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.7 While
preparations for the next annual meeting were being made, the Institute
decided to postpone final consideration of the defamation sections until
a time near completion of all work on the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, so that the Institute's Final deliberations on defamation could
take account of intervening development of the New York Times
doctrine. Events have proved the wisdom of that course. The most recent
decision affects not only matters ordinarily considered under the rubric
of privilege but also the requirement of proof of special harm that gave
rise to the controversy over libel per se and libel per quod.
II. ROSENBLOOM V. METROMEDIA, INC.
At the time of this writing, the latest Supreme Court decision in the
line initiated by New York Times is Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.'
It is also the most stunning sequel in several ways. As had happened
twice before in this series of cases,' no opinion was able to achieve
support from a majority of Justices. In fact, no more than three Justices
joined in any single opinion. Mr. Justice White, writing for himself
alone, summarized the tally this way:
[lit would seem that at least five members of the Court would support each of
the following rules:
For public officers and public figures to recover for damage to their reputations
for libelous falsehoods, they must prove either knowing or reckless disregard of the
truth. All other plaintiffs must prove at least negligent falsehood, but if the publica-
tion about them was in an area of legitimate public interest, then they too must
prove deliberate or reckless error. In all actions for libel or slander, actual damages
must be proved, and awards of punitive damages will be strictly limited. 10
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). In Rosenbloom the Supreme Court held that a constitutional privilege
applied to a radio station's report of the arrest of a private individual for possession of obscene
literature. The initial report described materials seized by the police as obscene, and subsequent
reports about plaintiffs lawsuit seeking injunctive relief against police interference with his business
used the terms "smut literature racket" and "girlie book peddlers." After obtaining an acquittal
on the criminal obscenity charges under an instruction of the trial judge that the literature involved
was not obscene, plaintiff instituted a diversity action in federal court seeking damages against the
radio station under Pennsylvania's libel law. The trial court rejected defendant's defense of constitu-
tional privilege and awarded damages on a jury verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed, 415 F.2d
892 (3d Cir. 1964). and on writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed this decision.
9. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967); cj] Cohen, A New' Niche for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming Newsworthiness Privilege
in Libel Cases?. 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 371, 378 n.39 (1970).
10. 403 U.S. at 59.
1972]
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One among the many implications of Rosenbloom is that in the
absence of proof of actual damage, it would no longer have been possi-
ble, as the Court was constituted on the date of this decision, to gather
a majority of the Justices for a judgment in favor of a public official or
a public figure who had been defamed by a statement that the publisher
knew to be false when he made it. Thus it appears that insofar as New
York Times said that a public official could recover damages under these
circumstances, it is no longer authoritative. Similarly, although the Su-
preme Court in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts" approved an award of
damages to a public figure based upon a magazine's publication of
defamatory charges with either knowledge of their falsity or reckless
disregard for their truth or falsity, 12 it appears that when Rosenbloom
was decided, such an award would not have won the support of a major-
ity of the Court without proof of actual damage.
3
Mr. Justice White's summary of the decision in Rosenbloom is
interesting not only because of what it says but also because of what it
omits. The quoted passage lacks any qualification limiting the stated
rules to actions against media, unless this qualification is to be inferred
from the context. Nor does his summary expressly limit in any way the
11. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
12. The Court's opinion, written by Mr. Justice Harlan-in which Justices Clark, Stewart,
and Fortas joined-approved the award on the less demanding ground of "highly unreasonable
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordi-
narily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155. The fifth vote for affirming the
award-that of Chief Justice Warren-was founded, however, on application of the New York
Times standard of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for truth or falsity. Id. at 162-70.
13. Although the standard of New York Times could not, on the day Rosenbloom was
decided, command a majority of the Court in support of a judgment for a public official who had
not proved actual damage, one might say New York Times has not been overruled because no case
presenting this question has yet reached the Court. One might also assert that since there was no
proof of knowing or reckless disregard of the truth in New York Times, everything said or implied
about the right of recovery in the event of such proof was obiter dictum. Similarly, one might say
that, because the issue of requiring actual damage has not yet been squarely presented, even Curtis
Publishing, in which approval of an award was holding and not mere dictum, has not been over-
ruled. Yet, the argument that there has been no overruling seems technical and tenuous. The fact
remains that 5 members of the Court-Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, Marshall, and Stew-
art-could be identified as supporting the requirement of actual damage. See text accompanying
notes 40-45 infra. It might be suggested that Justice Harlan's position on this point was not clearly
indicated in view of the statement in his opinion, "I would not overrule New York Times or Curtis
Publishing." 403 U.S. at 69. As observed in note 30 infra, however, he was saying that he would
adhere to the requirement that the defamatory statement be made either with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. He could consistently adhere to that view
while adding still another requirement-proof of actual damage-that was not considered in New
York Times or Curtis Publishing. It is submitted that his opinion as a whole indicates that this
was his view.
PRIVILEGE TO DEFAME
types of cases to which the stated requirements of actual damage and
fault-negligent falsehood, at a minimum-would be applied.
As an aid to understanding possible implications of Rosenbloom,
it may be useful to identify some propositions that one can derive from
an analysis of key passages in the several opinions and to indicate the
probable support for each proposition. For convenient reference, each
proposition is referred to by a number in brackets immediately preceding
it, and those propositions to which five or more Justices appear to have
committed themselves are italicized. Names of the individual Justices
who seem committed to a proposition are stated in parentheses immedi-
ately after that proposition, even though the explanation for inclusion
of some of the names may appear at a later point in this article. The
votes of Mr. Justice Douglas have been inferred from his opinions in
earlier cases, since he did not participate in Rosenbloom.
Before we consider the propositions in detail, two advance cautions
are in order. First, there are inconsistencies among them; indeed, some
of the propositions are in direct conflict with others. Secondly, in light
of the departures from the Court after Rosenbloom was decided, the
extent of support for each of these propositions is now even more specu-
lative than at the moment of that decision.1
4
The judgment of the Court in Rosenbloom was announced by Mr.
Justice Brennan. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Blackmun joined
in the Brennan opinion, which will be referred to as the plurality opinion.
This opinion rejects any standard that would limit the availability of
constitutional protection against private defamation actions solely to
those based upon reports about "public officials" or "public figures."
Instead, it says more broadly that [Proposition One] at least in the
context of defamation actions against media, constitutional protection
extends to reports concerning events ofpublic or general interest (Black,
Blackmun, Brennan, Burger, Douglas, Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart).
Also there is support in the plurality opinion for extending this protec-
tion beyond newspaper, magazine, radio, and television reporting. One
might interpret the plurality opinion as saying that [Proposition Two]
constitutional protection extends to all reporting of events of public or
general interest, not just media reporting (Blackmun, Brennan, Burger,
Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart; probably Black and Douglas).
14. The retirement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan has added to the confusion
concerning the Supreme Court's position. The views of these 2 justices are discussed in this article,
however, to give an accurate picture of the uncertain state of the law immediately after Rosenbloom.
Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, successors to Justices Black and Harlan, have not
yet had occasion to state their views on these issues.
19721
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Both Proposition One and Proposition Two are forecast in the
following excerpt from the opening paragraph of the plurality opinion:
"The several cases considered since New York Times involved actions
of 'public officials' or 'public figures,' usually, but not always, against
newspapers or magazines. Common to all the cases was a defamatory
falsehood in the report of an event of 'public or general interest.' "15
Moreover, at least Proposition One, if not also Proposition Two, is
explicitly stated in the following passage, appearing at the conclusion of
the fourth section of the opinion:
It is clear that there has emerged from our cases decided since New York Times
the concept that the First Amendment's impact upon state libel laws derives not so
much from whether the plaintiff is a "public official," "public figure," or "private
individual," as it derives from the question whether the allegedly defamatory publi-
cation concerns a matter of public or general interest. See T. Emerson, The System
of Freedom of Expression 531-532, 540 (1970). In that circumstance we think the
time has come forthrightly to announce that the determinant whether the First
Amendment applies to state libel actions is whether the utterance involved concerns
an issue of public or general concern, albeit leaving the delineation of the reach of
that term to future cases. As our Brother WHITE observes, that is not a problem
in this case, since police arrest of a person for distributing allegedly obscene maga-
zines clearly constitutes an issue of public or general interest."
Some further elaboration of Proposition One and, perhaps, Proposition
Two appears elsewhere in the plurality opinion:
Self-governance in the United States presupposes far more than knowledge and
debate about the strictly official activities of various levels of government. The
commitment of the country to the institution of private property, protected by the
Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses in the Constitution, places in private
hands vast areas of economic and social power that vitally affect the nature and
quality of life in the Nation. Our efforts to live and work together in a free society
not completely dominated by governmental regulation necessarily encompass far
more than politics in a narrow sense. "The guarantees for speech and press are not
the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs." . . . "Free-
dom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must
embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.'
17
In further explanation of the reason for extending constitutional
protection to reports concerning events of public or general interest, even
15. 403 U.S. at 30-31 (citations omitted). The cases cited in one of the footnotes to this
passage include: St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (action by deputy sheriff against
defeated candidate for the United States Senate); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (action
by former county recreation area supervisor against a newspaper columnist); Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (action by an official of an employer against a labor
union).
16. 403 U.S. at 44-45, (citations omitted). An omitted footnote, n. 12, is quoted in the text
accompanying note 19 infra.
17. Id. at 41 (citations omitted).
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if they do not concern public officials or public figures, the plurality
opinion adds:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become
less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the
individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary
interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the
content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonym-
ity or notoriety. . . . We honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues,
which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection
to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern,
without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous. 8
This passage leaves the way open for developing, and perhaps implies a
preference for developing, a rule that [Proposition Three] some of a
person's activities are not within the area of public or general interest
(Blackmun, Brennan, and Burger). Yet these activities are not necessar-
ily beyond the scope of constitutionally protected expression. This point
was made in the potentially significant footnote that was appended at
the conclusion of the foregoing passage:
We are not to be understood as implying that no area of a person's activities
falls outside the area of public or general interest. We expressly leave open the
question of what constitutional standard of proof, if any, controls the enforcement
of state libel laws for defamatory falsehoods published or broadcast by news media
about a person's activities not within the area of public or general interest.
We also intimate no view on the extent of constitutional protection, if any, for
purely commercial communications made in the course of business.19
Observe also that the above quoted footnote indicates that the three
Justices in the plurality hold open the possibility that there is some area
of defamation to which no constitutional protection applies-a proposi-
tion inconsistent with a uniformly applicable constitutional requirement
of actual damage, such as is stated in Mr. Justice White's summary.
Whom, then, does Mr. Justice White count as the minimum of five
supporters if the stated requirement of actual damage is not meant to
be limited to cases against news media or in some other way?
Proposition Three-some of a person's activities are not of public
or general interest-is given further support in another footnote to the
18. Id. at 43-44 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 44 n.12.
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plurality opinion, but only in reference to the private individual who
becomes involved in some official action:
Our Brother WHITE states in his opinion "[T]he First Amendment gives...
a privilege to report . . . the official actions of public servants in full detail, with
no requirement that.. the privacy of an individual involved in . . the official
action be spared from public view." . . . This seems very broad. It implies a
privilege to report, for example, such confidential records as those of juvenile court
proceedings.20
Elsewhere, however, the plurality opinion makes clear its support for
applying Proposition Three to public officials as well:
Voluntarily or not, we are all "public" men to some degree. Conversely, some
aspects of the lives of even the most public men fall outside the area of matters of
public or general concern. . . . Thus, the idea that certain "public" figures have
voluntarily exposed their entire lives to public inspection, while private individuals
have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at best, a legal fiction. In
any event, such a distinction could easily produce the paradoxical result of dampen-
ing discussion of issues of public or general concern because they happen to involve
private citizens while extending constitutional encouragement to discussion of as-




The plurality's recognition that there may be utterances beyond the
protection provided by constitutional privileges of speech and press is
founded not only upon potential limitation of those privileges but also
upon their clash with the interest in privacy, which may be constitution-
ally protected. Thus, in another pregnant footnote, the opinion declares:
Our Brothers HARLAN and MARSHALL would not limit the application
of the First Amendment to private libels involving issues of general or public
interest. They would hold that the amendment covers all private libels at least where
state law permits the defense of truth. The Court has not yet had occasion to
consider the impact of the First Amendment on the application of state libel laws
to libels where no issue of general or public interest is involved . . . . However,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), recognized a constitutional right to
privacy and at least one commentator has discussed the relation of that right to the
First Amendment. T. Emerson, [The System of Freedom of Expression], at 544-
562. Since all agree that this case involves an issue of public or general interest, we
have no occasion to discuss that relationship . . . . We do not, however, share the
doubts of our Brothers HARLAN and MARSHALL that courts would be unable
to identify interests in privacy and dignity. The task may be difficult but not more
so than other tasks in this field.22
This passage suggests that the plurality might favor a rule that
[Proposition Four] actions by an individual for invasion of his right of
privacy by means other than reporting on matters of public or general
20. Id. at 45 n. 13 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 48 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 48-49 n. 17 (citations omitted).
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interest are constitutionally protected (Blackmun, Brennan, and
Burger). This rule would impose a constitutional barrier in privacy ac-
tions to recognizing a privilege as broad as the New York Times
formulation of the constitutional privilege in defamation actions. That
is, it would weigh against extending, to actions for invading privacy, a
New York Times-type privilege that would defeat a claim unless the
complaining public official proved that the defendant published a false
report with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not.2 Such a privilege would swallow up a public official's
right of privacy except in "malicious false-light" cases. This recognition
of constitutional protection for whatever right of privacy is salvaged
after full scope is given to the privilege of reporting on matters of public
or general interest underscores the irony, which Professor Kalven has
highlighted, 2 that the original proponents of the right of privacy exposed
it to an ill-starred fate when they acknowledged a privilege to report on
matters of public or general interest.
To complete our sketch of the plurality position, we must also
mention the underlying rule, carried forward from the New York Times
decision, that, [Proposition Five] to sustain an action for defamation
when the public-or-general-interest privilege applies, the complainant
must offer "clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood
was published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not '-2 5 (Black, Blackmun, Brennan, Burger,
and Douglas).
Broad as the plurality's doctrine of constitutional privilege may be,
the quoted passages indicate: first, that the public-or-general-interest
standard probably will not swallow up the whole field of defamation;
secondly, that other standards of constitutional protection for free ex-
pression may occupy some part or all of the remaining field; thirdly, that
constitutional protection for an individual's right of privacy may clash
with free expression; and fourthly, that state law may still apply if there
is some part of the field beyond the scope of all constitutional standards.
23. Of course, it is not certain now that as many as 5 members of the Court would support
the New York Times formulation of privilege even in defamation cases, although the support of at
least 5 would have been assured, at the time Rosenbloom was decided, if the formulation were
qualified to require either that the report concern matters of public or general interest or that the
public official did not prove that the report caused him actual damage. See text accompanying notes
13-14 supra and text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
24. See Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 326 (1966).
25. 403 U.S. at 52.
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Moreover, it seems to be assumed that the constitutional standard or
standards protecting free expression supplant only state law that is less
protective of publication and not, for example, state law supporting an
even broader privilege. Thus, if we follow the plurality position, simplifi-
cation of the whole law of defamation is not to be an immediate conse-
quence of the evolving constitutional privilege. For the present, at least,
we are left with the possibility of an occasional application of all or most
of the old and complex common law of defamation.
Mr. Justice Black concurred in the Court's judgment in
Rosenbloom, but on a basis indicating his preference for a rule that
[Proposition Six] "the First Amendment does not permit the recovery
of libel judgments against the news media even when statements are
broadcast with knowledge they are false"2 (Black and Douglas). He
added "the First Amendment was intended to leave the press free from
the harassment of libel judgments.1 27 Although Mr. Justice Douglas did
not participate in Rosenbloom, his opinions both in New York Times
and in its other sequels indicate that he would join Black in supporting
Proposition Six. Mr. Justice Black's opinion does not speak to the
question whether, in addition to this all-embracing constitutional im-
munity for news media, he would have recognized any constitutional
immunity or privilege for others. Even before Rosenbloom, however, it
seemed very likely that both Black and Douglas would have recognized,
at the least, some form of a constitutional privilege both for nonmedia
communication about public officials or public figures and for nonmedia
communication about matters of public or general interest.
Mr. Justice White cast the fifth vote in support of the judgment in
Rosenbloom but not on the same grounds as either the plurality opinion
or Mr. Justice Black's concurrence. Instead, he would have preferred a
rule that [Proposition Seven] "absent actual malice as defined in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan the First Amendment gives the press and
the broadcast media a privilege to report and comment upon the official
actions of public servants in full detail, with no requirement that the
reputation or the privacy of an individual involved in or affected by the
official action be spared from public view"'28 (Black, Douglas, and
White). Since he preferred not to "adjudicate cases not now before the
Court,' 2 he did not indicate how he would have answered many other
26. Id. at 57.
27. Id.




questions discussed in other opinions-among them, whether he would
have extended the constitutional privilege beyond media cases.
As already noted, Mr. Justice White stated in his summary that at
least five members of the Court would have supported a rule that
[Proposition Eight] a public officer or public figure will not be allowed
to recover for damage to reputation from libelous falsehood if he does
not prove either knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth
(White; probably Black, Douglas, and Harlan). It is not clear whether
Mr. Justice White intended some unstated qualifications of this rule or,
if not, which other Justices he was counting. In cases against media, it
seems that Mr. Justice Harlan would have supported this proposition,30
as would have Justices Black and Douglas. On the other hand, it seems
doubtful that either the three Justices in the plurality -Blackman, Bren-
nan, and Burger-or Justices Marshall and Stewart would have sup-
ported this proposition without qualification, even as to cases against
media. Therefore, it appears that the following questions cannot be
answered with assurance: (1) Might Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and
Burger disagree with Proposition Eight if the defamation concerned only
private affairs of a public officer? (2) Might Justices Marshall and Stew-
art reject it if the defamed officer proved actual damage? (3) Might some
or even all support from other members of the Court be lost if Mr.
Justice White meant the proposition to apply to nonmedia publications?
In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice White observed that each of
the other opinions filed in Rosenbloom "decides broader constitutional
issues and displaces more state libel law than is necessary for the decision
in this case."13' As an example, he criticized the plurality opinion because
it would "extend the constitutional protection to false and damaging,
but non-malicious, publications about such matters as the health and
environmental hazards of widely used manufactured products, the men-
tal and emotional stability of executives of business establishments, and
the racial and religious prejudices of many groups and individuals. ' 32
He also disapproved the position of the three dissenting Jus-
30. In his dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan said: "New York Times . . . and Curtis Publishing
.. . established that where the injured party is a 'public figure' or a 'public official,' the interest
in freedom of speech dictates that the States forego their interest in compensating for actual harm,
even upon a basis generally applicable to all members of society, unless the plaintiff can show that
the injurious publication was false and was made 'with "actual malice"--that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.' . I would not overrule
New York Times or Curtis Publishing. ... Id. at 69.




tices-Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart: "They would make more sweep-
ing incursions into state tort law but purportedly with less destructive
weapons. They would permit suit by some plaintiffs barred under Mr.
Justice BRENNAN's opinion, but would require all plaintiffs to prove
at least negligence before any recovery would be allowed."3
In his separate dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan expressed
agreement with the view, which he found implicitly recognized in the
plurality opinion, that [Proposition Nine] the constitutional protection
of the New York Times rule does not extend in full force to all purely
private libels (Blackmun, Brennan, Burger, Harlan, Marshall, Stewart,
and White). Justices Marshall and Stewart would concur in this proposi-
tion since they at least would permit the application of a different stan-
dard of fault in some cases, if not complete abandonment of the New
York Times rule. Furthermore, it would seem that Proposition Nine
also is recognized in Mr. Justice White's opinion.
Justices Harlan, 35 Marshall, and Stewart 36 apparently would have
held that another constitutional rule applies to all libel cases: the Consti-
tution will not permit the imposition of liability without fault in libel
cases. Surely Justices Black and Douglas would have supported this
principle in media cases, if not in others. Thus, at the time Rosenbloom
was decided, at least five members of the Court would have supported a
rule that [Proposition Ten] in libel cases against media at least, the
Constitution will not permit the imposition of liability without fault; all
plaintiffs in such cases must prove at least negligent falsehood (Black,
Douglas, Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart).
In addition, although Justices Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart
would have rejected the standard stated in Proposition Five-knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity-it seems they, never-
theless, would have joined the plurality in supporting Proposition
One-constitutional protection for media reports concerning events of
public or general interest-and Proposition Two--constitutional protec-
tion for all such reports-since those propositions, narrower because
limited to public-or-general-interest cases, are embraced within their
broader position.
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent pointed up other constitutional distinc-
tions. It indicated that the states should be free to define the standard
33. Id. at 59-60.
34. Id. at 62.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 78.
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of care applicable to private libel actions, so long as they do not impose
liability without fault.37 Elaborating on this point, Harlan expressed the
view that [Proposition Eleven] there is a difference between public and
private plaintiffs, and when the plaintiff is an ordinary citizen, the Fed-
eral Constitution does not require that the states adhere to a standard
other than reasonable care38 (Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart). This posi-
tion also is found in the opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall3 9 in which Mr.
Justice Stewart joined. Moreover, Harlan concurred with the recogni-
tion by Marshall and Stewart that [Proposition Twelve] at least in
actions against media,4" a showing of actual damage is a constitutional
requisite to recovery for libel, even if private41 (that is, the Constitution
prohibits awards for presumed damage)2 (Black, Douglas, Harlan,
Marshall, and Stewart). Also Harlan supported the view of Marshall
and Stewart that [Proposition Thirteen] jury verdicts in actions based
on libel, even if private, are subject to judicial confinement to protect
the substantial constitutional values involved 3 (Harlan, Marshall, and
Stewart). On the matter of punitive damages, however, Harlan parted
company with Marshall and Stewart. He would have held that
[Proposition Fourteen] an award of punitive damages in a private libel
action, if it bears a reasonable and purposeful relationship to actual
harm done and is assessed only when the publication was made with
actual malice, is not prohibited by the Constitution44 (Harlan). On the
other hand, Marshall and Stewart argue that [Proposition Fifteen] the
Constitution prohibits all awards of punitive damages for libel (Mar-
shall and Stewart; as to cases against media, at least, Black and Doug-
las).
Despite differences in other respects, there is a common element
running through Propositions Fourteen and Fifteen, as well as Mr. Jus-
37. Id. at 64.
38. Id. at 69.
39. Id. at 79.
40. This qulalification, not stated in the Harlan and Marshall opinions, would seem to bring
this proposition within both Black's stated view in Rosenbloom and that expressed by Douglas in
other cases.
41. 403 U.S. at 64.
42. Id. at 66. With respect to proved actual damage, Harlan would apply some particular
criteria of causal connection, id., but it is not clear whether Marshall and Stewart also would adopt
these criteria. Furthermore, Harlan would deny recovery to public officers and public figures in
actions against media if there were proof of actual damage but no proof of either knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard of truth. Id. at 69; see note 30 supra.
43. 403 U.S. at 77.
44. Jd. at 73.
45. Id. at 87.
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tice Black's opinion. Mr. Justice White stated this common ground as
one of the propositions supported by at least five members of the Court.
Qualified as to application beyond media cases, the proposition is as
follows: [Proposition Sixteen] As a matter of constitutional imperative,
"awards of punitive damages will be strictly limited"" at least in libel
actions against media (Black, Douglas, Harlan, Marshall, and Stewart).
Among these sixteen propositions extracted from the opinions in
Rosenbloom are some that may have significant impact on the ALI
controversy over Restatement section 569 and on the law of defamation
more generally. The remaining portion of this article considers briefly
these potential consequences of Rosenbloom.
III. ROSENBLOOM'S IMPACT ON RESTATEMENT SECTION 569
Proposition Twelve-at least in media cases' actual damage is a
constitutional requisite to recovery for libel-bears directly on the con-
troversy over section 569 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In some
respects it goes even further than Dean Prosser's proposal and the pre-
cedents he adduced. It denies liability in all cases against media not
involving proof of "actual damage," including cases in which the de-
famatory innuendo is apparent and those in which the innuendo falls
within one of the four special categories derived from the law of slander
per se. Whether it is more or less protective than Dean Prosser's pro-
posal in another respect-on the ground that requiring the plaintiff to
prove "actual damage" gives the defendant more or less protection than
requiring the plaintiff to prove "special harm or loss of reputation"--is
open to question.47 If less protective, it would not preclude application
46. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
47. One may infer that the opinions of Justices Harlan and Marshall, repeatedly referring
to "actual damage," reflect a studied avoidance of the phrase "special harm," which is commonly
used in the law of both libel and slander in relation to the requirement of proof of damage. Harlan
also uses the following descriptive phrases: "actual, measurable injury," 403 U.S. at 64; "actual,
measurable harm," id. at 66; "actual and measurable injury," id.; and "measurable adverse
consequences," id. at 67. Marshall uses still other phrases: "proof that there was in fact financial
loss, physical or emotional suffering, or that the plaintiff's standing in the community was dimin-
ished," id. at 83 (saying that state defamation law does not require this proof); "proven, actual
injuries," id. at 84; "award . . .based on essentially objective, discernible factors," id.; "actual
losses," id. at 86; and "damages can be awarded for more than direct pecuniary loss but they must
be related to some proven harm," id. Compare the quotations above with the following description
of required proof in Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65 (1966)
(defamation action of employer official against labor union): "We therefore hold that a complain-
ant may not recover except upon proof of [resulting] harm, which may include general injury to
reputation, consequent mental suffering, alienation of associates, specific items of pecuniary loss,
or whatever form of harm would be recognized by state tort law."
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of the more protective rule of state law, since this constitutional rule
defines only the minimum protection that the Constitution compels and
not the maximum it permits.
The constitutional requirement in cases against defendants other
than news media is more doubtful. Would the three Justices who favored
the proof-of-actual-damage rule-Harlan, Marshall and Stewart-have
applied it in all cases, or does their expressed concern about self-
censorship imply that they were fashioning a rule only for media and,
perhaps, participants in public discussion? Likewise, did Justices Black
and Douglas favor eliminating defamation actions entirely, or were they
speaking only about a general freedom for the media plus, perhaps, a
freedom for others at least with regard to discussion of issues of public
or general interest?
Proposition Twelve can be reconciled with the black letter of section
569 of the original Restatement of Torts. In the first place, the phrase
"without a privilege to do so" appeared in that black letter. If Proposi-
tion Twelve is treated as stating a constitutional privilege, it is, in effect,
incorporated by reference. On similar grounds, also, Proposition Twelve
can be reconciled with the Prosser and Wade proposals for revision of
section 569. In each of the three cases, however, both the scope and the
practical significance of section 569 would be substantially reduced by
the newly recognized constitutional "privilege." The impact would be
greatest on the original text of section 569, least on the Prosser proposal,
and somewhere in between on the Wade amendment.
Reconciliation of section 569 with constitutional protections be-
comes more difficult when we take into account Proposition Ten-at
least in media cases, all plaintiffs must prove negligent falsehood. This
proposition clashes directly with both the original version and the Pros-
ser version of section 569. The Wade amendment to section 569, as it
was phrased above, says one is not liable "in the absence of proof of
special harm or loss of reputation unless he knew or should have known
of the extrinsic facts which were necessary to make the statement defam-
atory in its innuendo." 4 If read as stating only a rule of nonliability,
the Wade version is literally consistent with Proposition Ten, and in this
sense it has emerged with the best chance of the three for survival after
Rosenbloom. But it, too, is open to a charge of inconsistency in spirit,
if not in letter. The "unless" clause may be interpreted as implying
liability when its terms are met, even though there has been no proof of
special harm or loss of reputation. Moreover, in order to establish "neg-
48. See note 5 supra concerning the choice of phrasing.
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ligent falsehood" one would need to prove that the defendant knew or
should have known of the defamatory innuendo and its falsity, and not
merely that he "knew or should have known of the extrinsic facts."
Certainly,* many if not all the ALl supporters of the Wade version as-
sumed, when voting, that liability could be imposed without proof of
special harm or loss of reputation when the plaintiff proved that the
defendant knew or should have known of the extrinsic facts. This un-
stated assumption clashes directly with Proposition Ten.
If some area of the law of defamation remains unaffected by consti-
tutional doctrine, and Restatement section 569 is to speak to that residue
of libel law, modification of the Wade version might be the simplest
means of accomplishing this objective. A draft that would eliminate the
constitutional objections which could be raised under Propositions Ten
and Twelve might read as follows: "One who falsely, and without a
privilege to do so, publishes matter defamatory to another [in such a
manner as to make the publication a libel] is liable to the other if, but
only if, (i) he knew or should have known of the defamatory innuendo
and its falsity and (ii) the other proves actual damage." Because of its
use of the qualifying phrase "without a privilege to do so," this revision
of section 569 also would be consistent with Proposition
One-protection of constitutional privilege for reports of public or gen-
eral interest. And there is no doubt about its consistency with each of
the other propositions extracted from Rosenbloom for which there were
at least five committed supporters on the Court when that case was
decided.
The proposed draft is inconsistent, however, with common law pre-
cedents concerning libel per se and, in those jurisdictions following the
original version of section 569, libel generally. With the bracketed phrase
excluded, it is also inconsistent with common law precedents concerning
slander and slander per se. These departures from common law are
required for consistency with the newly recognized constitutional imper-
atives, at least in media cases, against liability without both
fault-Proposition Ten-and proof of actual damage-Proposition
Twelve.
It is possible, of course, that the Supreme Court will abandon
Propositions Ten and Twelve before the ALI acts on section 569. On
the other hand, by that time the Court may have extended these proposi-
tions to defamation actions generally. Even if the scope of constitutional
protection remains in its present state of uncertainty, an Institute con-
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cerned with promoting clarity and uniformity in the law might favor the
promulgation of a set of rules more explicitly interpreting the constitu-
tional requirements. Indeed, if this choice does not commend itself to the
ALl membership, the argument for postponing or abandoning any ef-
fort to restate the law of libel in the present circumstances might seem
a more appealing alternative than adopting an elaborate set of rules for
the residue of defamation actions thought to fall outside the area of
constitutional protection, while only vaguely stating the terms of the
constitutional protection itself.
Resolution of the controversy over seciton 569 in the manner sug-
gested may contribute very little to clarification or improvement of the
complex state and federal law of defamation that is our current heritage.
The controversy over section 569 is, in a sense, beside the main stream
of problems opened up by the series of Supreme Court decisions initiated
with New York Times. These decisions have begun to work out a new
accommodation among the fundamental interests in freedom of expres-
sion, security of good name, and the right to privacy. Therefore, our
primary concern should be directed toward the major unfinished busi-
ness of developing a wise and orderly accommodation among the basic
social interests whose conflicting claims to recognition have led to the
current chaos in the law of defamation.
IV. THE BROAD IMPACT OF REVISED CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
The desire to attain evenhanded justice exerts a pressure toward
complexity of law because it encourages sensitively refined distinc-
tions--detailed evaluations of all the competing factors that seem rele-
vant to judging. Moreover, unrestrained pursuit of all the refinements
for which reasoned support can be marshalled sacrifices other values 49
and is, in the end, self-defeating. Regardless of the criticisms that might
be leveled against particular rules, the law of defamation, even within
any single state, is probably too complex now to serve the public interest
well. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that today most substantial
intrusions on security of good name are associated with interstate publi-
cation. Consequently, a single case often involves constitutional, statu-
tory, and decisional doctrines of numerous states as well as overriding
49. Cf. J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW-THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM 85-110 (1969) (calling
attention to the disadvantages of multiplying decision points in a legal system). See also R.
KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 1.6 at 24-25 (1971) and R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 65-
74 (1969) (both discussing the added disadvantages when the criteria for decision require case-by-
case findings that are evaluative rather than merely factual in character).
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federal law. Although this potential for inordinate complexity in the law
of defamation has been present in our federal system from the outset,
the problem has become both more apparent and more immediate be-
cause of the Supreme Court's recent interpretations of federal constitu-
tional imperatives. Further changes in the law of defamation are inevita-
ble, and the aim of simplification should be a significant factor in shap-
ing them.
Although a plea for simplification of the law bearing on such issues
as freedom of expression, security of good name, and privacy may seem
to undervalue the fundamental interests at stake, we can safeguard those
interests through wisely chosen methods of simplification. The uncer-
tainty and difficulty of comprehension inherent in relatively complex
rules tend to discourage free expression by inducing publishers to steer
a course well clear of the treacherous limits of privilege. Thus, the opera-
tional rule represents an accommodation among conflicting interests
that is less protective of free expression than the stated rule. In view of
both this fact and the increased scope of the constitutional privilege to
defame under recent Supreme Court decisions, a revised body of state
law confining privilege in defamation cases to the minimum constitu-
tional requirement might serve the interests of free expression about as
well as a combination of the constitutional privilege with varied state-
law privileges, some purportedly broader than constitutionally required.
Moreover, since the federal law is now so unsettled, perhaps it is timely
to suggest that we might more easily achieve a chosen degree of protec-
tion for free expression and a corresponding limitation of protection for
security of good name by eliminating all state-law rules of privilege and
broadening the federal-law privileges as needed to accomplish the chosen
accommodation. Some further changes in the scope of the federal-law
privilege will be effected as decisions of the Supreme Court answer
currently unsettled questions. If these changes do not broaden privilege
to the optimum degree, Congress might accomplish the further expan-
sion directly, by statutory prescription,'" or indirectly by a mandate
declaring that a uniform rule fashioned by federal judicial decisions shall
supplant the varied state rules previously applied. 5'
50. Cf. Wright, Dejamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know: A National Problem
and a New Approach, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 630, 643-48 (1968).
51. Although statutes have rarely been drafted to declare explicitly such a judicial power and
responsibility for fashioning new rules of law, allocation to the courts of some degree of power and
responsibility for completing the task of lawmaking initiated by the legislature is implicit in every
statute. Cf. Leflar, Comment on Maki v. Frelk, 21 VAND. L. REV. 918 (1968). See also R. KEETON,
'VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 78-97 (1969).
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If simplification is accomplished in the near future by developing a
single system of federal defamation law in lieu of the current multiplicity
of systems, efforts expended in a revised Restatement of state law, even
though indirectly useful, will have been somewhat misdirected. On the
other hand, a revised Restatement might serve a significant role if sim-
plification is to be achieved through uniformity in state decisional doc-
trines concerning those aspects of the law of defamation not controlled
by constitutional imperatives. In the revision of the Restatement, it will
be appropriate to reconsider any rules of privilege that have been ren-
dered obsolete either by Supreme Court decisions or otherwise. For
example, if a constitutional imperative against liability without proof of
"actual damage" is established, then a state court that has preserved
historical distinctions between libel and slander and between slander and
slander per se may well find it appropriate to consider whether these
distinctions still serve a useful purpose. Even if constitutionally permissi-
ble, would it be in the public interest to maintain for some cases, but
not others, a more rigorous requirement of "special harm," narrower
in scope than "actual damage"? Although this is an issue no state court
has yet examined, it should not be foreclosed from consideration in the
drafting of a revised Restatement. Thus, a revised Restatement, if it is
to make the optimum contribution, must be somewhat less confined by
the contours of previous state court decisions than is customary in Re-
statement drafting. This necessity arises from the fact that nearlfT all of
the pertinent state decisions have been rendered in a context of assump-
tions about federal constitutional principles that have been overturned
recently. Inevitably, these changed assumptions will have far-reaching
impact on the entire law of defamation and privacy.
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